Virtu Financial Interview Questions 2026

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Virtu Financial Quant Interview Practice

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A shop marks a camera up by 50% over its wholesale cost, then advertises 20% off that marked price. A customer pays the discounted merchandise price plus a $12 delivery charge.

After a return-related complaint, the shop refunds 25% of what the customer paid for the merchandise, and separately refunds the entire $12 delivery charge. The customer has now paid a net $108 after both refunds. What was the shop's original wholesale cost of the camera?

Hint 1

The shipping charge ultimately contributes nothing to the customer's net payment. Work backwards only through the adjustments to merchandise.

If C is the wholesale cost, first apply the 50% markup, then the 20% sale reduction, then retain 75% of that paid merchandise amount.

Let C be the wholesale cost. The marked price is \(1.50C\). After the 20% sale reduction, the merchandise paid amount is \(0.80(1.50C)=1.20C\). The later refund is 25% of this amount, so the customer ultimately retains a charge of \(0.75(1.20C)=0.90C\) for the camera. The $12 delivery payment and the $12 delivery refund cancel exactly. The observed net payment therefore satisfies \(0.90C=108\), giving \(C=\$120\).

Forward-check: A $120 camera is marked at $180 and sold at $144. Adding $12 shipping produces an initial charge of $156. The shop subsequently returns $36 for merchandise and $12 for delivery, a $48 total refund. The final net payment is \(\$156-\$48=\$108\). The 25% refund applies to the discounted merchandise payment, not to the original wholesale cost or the total including shipping.

Assumptions

  • All percentages apply exactly as stated and there are no taxes or additional fees.

  • The delivery fee is charged and fully refunded independently of the merchandise refund.

  • The $108 amount is the customer’s final net cash outlay.

Final Answer

$120 wholesale cost.

Numerical reasoning and estimation
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Two equally matched teams are scored by a shared judging system. The joint distribution of their scores is unchanged if the two team labels are swapped, but the scores need not be independent: a common judge can shift both scores on the same day. Organisers know that a tie occurs with probability 18%.

What is the probability that Team A finishes strictly ahead of Team B? Give a reason that does not assume independent scores or rule out ties.

Hint 1

The three possibilities are A ahead, B ahead, or a tie; together they have probability 1.

Exchangeability means swapping the team labels cannot change a joint-event probability, so \(\Pr(A>B)=\Pr(B>A)\).

Let X and Y be the two scores. Exchangeability says \((X,Y)\) and \((Y,X)\) have the same joint distribution, even if X and Y are dependent. Therefore \(p=\Pr(X>Y)=\Pr(Y>X)\).

Exactly one of \(X>Y\), \(Y>X\), or \(X=Y\) occurs. As \(\Pr(X=Y)=0.18\), we have \(2p+0.18=1\) and \(p=\frac{1-0.18}{2}=0.41\). An independent-scores assumption would be unnecessary and potentially false; label symmetry alone establishes equality of the strict-win probabilities. A check is \(0.41+0.41+0.18=1\).

Assumptions

  • The full joint scoring law is invariant under swapping Team A and Team B.

  • A tie means equal reported scores, and its unconditional probability is 0.18.

Final Answer

41%, since the two strict-win events split the 82% probability of a non-tie equally.

Probability foundations
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A reception desk repeats the same schedule of four back-to-back service intervals: first 3 minutes, then 7, then 2, then 8. After the final interval, the 20-minute cycle immediately starts again. An inspector arrives at a time chosen uniformly from one complete cycle; arrival exactly at a boundary has probability zero.

What is the probability that more than four minutes remain in whichever interval contains the arrival? It is not correct to regard the four intervals as equally likely to be visited.

Hint 1

A uniformly sampled moment is more likely to fall inside a long interval than a short one.

Within an interval of length \(L\), exactly \(\max(L-4,0)\) minutes of arrival times leave more than four minutes remaining. Add those lengths and divide by 20.

The inspector selects a time, not one of four interval labels. In an interval of length \(L\), an arrival leaves more than four minutes remaining exactly when it occurs in the first \(L-4\) minutes, provided \(L>4\). The qualifying time has length \((L-4)_+=\max(L-4,0)\).

For the four successive lengths 3, 7, 2 and 8, the qualifying portions have lengths 0, 3, 0 and 4 minutes. These portions are disjoint within the 20-minute cycle. Uniform calendar-time sampling gives

\[\Pr(\text{remaining time}>4)=\frac{0+3+0+4}{3+7+2+8}=\frac7{20}.\]

Equivalently, the inspector enters the seven-minute interval with probability \(7/20\) and then has chance \(3/7\) of seeing more than four minutes left, or enters the eight-minute interval with probability \(8/20\) and then has chance \(4/8\). Their sum is \(3/20+4/20=7/20\). Counting the long intervals as two of four without weighting by their duration would answer a different sampling question. Strict versus non-strict boundaries do not alter a continuous-time probability.

Assumptions

  • The service schedule is deterministic and repeats without gaps or overlaps.

  • Arrival is uniform over the 20-minute cycle, independently of the schedule.

  • Remaining time is measured to the end of the interval containing the inspector's arrival.

Final Answer

\(\frac7{20}=35\%\).

Conditional probability
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A tiny tasting event has just two seats, but five customers are booked. One customer, A, is certain to attend. B, C, D and E attend independently with probabilities 3/4, 1/2, 1/2 and 1/4 respectively. These are the only customers; non-attendees owe nothing and receive no voucher.

If more than two attend, the organiser admits customers in booking order A, B, C, D, E and denies the later bookings until exactly two remain. A denied customer receives a cash voucher of £200 for B, £120 for C, £80 for D or £40 for E. The organiser wants to budget for vouchers before anyone arrives.

Find the expected total voucher payment. Why is multiplying a single average voucher by the expected number of excess attendees generally unsafe here?

Hint 1

For each person, find the event that this particular person attends but is denied entry; use indicator variables for individual vouchers.

Because A always attends, B can never be denied. C is denied when B and C arrive; D is denied when D arrives with B or C; E is denied when E arrives with at least one of B,C,D.

A always takes one seat. The second seat is awarded to the earliest-attending name among B,C,D,E. Thus B, when present, is always admitted and never generates a voucher.

C is turned away if both B and C attend, an event of probability \((3/4)(1/2)=\frac38\). D is turned away if D attends and at least one of B or C attends. By independence, that probability is \((1/2)[1-(1-3/4)(1-1/2)]=(1/2)(1-1/8)=\frac7{16}\). E is turned away if E attends and at least one of B, C or D attends: \((1/4)[1-(1/4)(1/2)(1/2)]=(1/4)(15/16)=\frac{15}{64}\).

Let \(I_C,I_D,I_E\) indicate these denied-boarder events. The voucher total is \(V=120I_C+80I_D+40I_E\) in pounds; simultaneous denials are allowed, so independence among these indicators is neither needed nor asserted. By linearity,

\[\mathbb E[V]=120(3/8)+80(7/16)+40(15/64)=45+35+9.375=\text{£}89.375=\text{£}\frac{715}{8}\].

This agrees with a direct enumeration of the 16 possible attendance subsets for B,C,D,E, weighting each by its independent attendance probability, admitting the earliest two and summing their denied customers' stated vouchers.

Different denied customers receive different amounts, and the priority order makes their denial probabilities unequal. The expected number denied is \(\frac38+\frac7{16}+\frac{15}{64}=\frac{67}{64}\), but multiplying that by an arbitrary unweighted 'average voucher' would not recover the expected payment. Person-specific indicators are the correct accounting units.

Assumptions

  • A attends with probability one; B,C,D,E are independently present or absent.

  • Admission is first-come by the fixed booking-priority order, with exactly two seats.

  • Vouchers are paid only to attendees denied a seat, with values fixed by identity; multiple payments may occur.

Final Answer

Expected compensation liability = \(\text{£}\frac{715}{8}=\text{£}89.375\).

Expectation and expected value
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In a route-choice simulation, two rescue crews, A and B, each secretly choose either the narrow Pass (P) or a Detour (D). The two crews cannot both use the Pass safely. Their exercise scores, in points, are specified by the following game table; the first number is A's score and the second is B's:

A's choice B chooses P B chooses D
P \((−4, −5)\) \((5, 1)\)
D \((1, 4)\) \((2, 2)\)

Each crew wants to maximise its own expected score. First find the mixed Nash equilibrium in which each crew independently randomises its route. Then a dispatcher offers a different arrangement: they draw a joint pair of route recommendations, send each crew only its own recommendation, and announce the lottery's probabilities in advance. Neither crew sees the other message. Construct a joint lottery, using \((P,D)\), \((D,P)\) and \((D,D)\) with positive probabilities and never \((P,P)\), that makes both crews better off in expectation than the independent mixed equilibrium. Verify that neither crew gains by disobeying either recommendation, given what that message tells them.

Hint 1

For independent mixed Nash, make each crew indifferent between P and D given the other's mixing probability. With a private recommendation, update what each crew believes about the other message.

Try the joint lottery assigning probabilities \(\frac25,\frac25\) and \(\frac15\) to \((P,D)\), \((D,P)\) and \((D,D)\). For each crew, compare obey-versus-deviate conditional on receiving P and again conditional on receiving D.

Let \(p\) be A's independent probability of P and \(q\) B's. A's payoff from P against B's mix is \(5(1-q)-4q=5-9q\); from D it is \(2(1-q)+q=2-q\). Indifference gives \(q=3/8\). B's payoff from P against A's mix is \(4(1-p)-5p=4-9p\); from D it is \(2(1-p)+p=2-p\). Hence \(p=1/4\). Both probabilities are interior, so this is the fully mixed Nash equilibrium. The corresponding expected scores are \(5-9(3/8)=13/8\) for A and \(4-9(1/4)=7/4\) for B.

Now consider the correlated recommendation distribution

\(\Pr(A=P,B=D)=2/5\), \(\Pr(A=D,B=P)=2/5\), \(\Pr(A=D,B=D)=1/5\), and \(\Pr(P,P)=0\).

A's expected score is \((2/5)5+(2/5)1+(1/5)2=14/5=2.8\); B's is \((2/5)1+(2/5)4+(1/5)2=12/5=2.4\). Both exceed their mixed Nash scores (1.625 and 1.75).

We must verify obedience, not just high average scores. If A is told P, B must have been told D; A earns 5 by obeying versus 2 by switching to D. If B is told P, A must have been told D; B earns 4 by obeying versus 2 by switching. If A is told D, conditional on that message B was told P with probability \((2/5)/(3/5)=2/3\), and D with probability \(1/3\). A's expected obeying score is \((2/3)1+(1/3)2=4/3\), versus \((2/3)(-4)+(1/3)5=-1\) if A deviates to P. If B is told D, A was told P with probability \(2/3\) and D with \(1/3\); B scores \(4/3\) by obeying and \((2/3)(-5)+(1/3)4=-2\) by deviating. All four inequalities favour obedience. This is a correlated equilibrium: a shared private lottery coordinates the crews in a way independent mixing cannot reproduce, without requiring any crew to observe the other's recommendation.

Assumptions

  • This is an explicitly scored simulation; scores are stipulated game points, not unexplained financial utility.

  • Each crew knows the game and recommendation lottery, observes only its private message, and may choose either route regardless of the message.

  • There is no communication after private recommendations and no repeated-game enforcement.

Final Answer

Independent mixed Nash: A uses P with probability \(1/4\), B with probability \(3/8\), for expected scores \(13/8\) (A) and \(7/4\) (B). One obedient correlated lottery is \(\Pr(P,D)=2/5\), \(\Pr(D,P)=2/5\), \(\Pr(D,D)=1/5\). It gives expected scores \(14/5\) and \(12/5\), improving both.

Game theory and strategic decisions
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In a stylized trading game, a claim will pay either $80 or $120 tomorrow, each initially equally likely. Two brokers receive binary inspection notes. A correct note identifies the high or low payoff with probability 75%. With probability 1/2 the brokers have copied the same single note; otherwise they received independently generated notes, each conditionally correct with probability 75%. Whether they shared a note is hidden, and the sharing decision is independent of the payoff.

Each broker is committed to request one claim whenever its note says “high”; a request does not depend further on the dealer's quote. The dealer observes that both brokers request to buy and wants the conditional expected payoff per claim, not a revenue-maximizing offer. What is that fair value? How would the estimate be distorted by treating the two requests as independent confirmations?

Hint 1

Separate the hidden “copied a note” case from the “two independent notes” case before applying Bayes' rule.

Compute the joint probability of two high notes under each true payoff: \(\tfrac12(3/4)+\tfrac12(3/4)^2\) if payoff is $120, and replace 3/4 by 1/4 if payoff is $80.

Let \(H\) denote the $120 payoff and \(Q\) the event that both notes say high (hence two buy requests). Conditional on H, a shared note is high with probability \(3/4\), while two independent notes are both high with probability \((3/4)^2\). With equal probabilities of sharing and independent generation,
\[ P(Q\mid H)=\tfrac12\cdot\tfrac34+\tfrac12\left(\tfrac34\right)^2 =\frac{21}{32}. \]
Under the $80 payoff, the probabilities of a false-high note are \(1/4\), so
\[ P(Q\mid L)=\tfrac12\cdot\tfrac14+\tfrac12\left(\tfrac14\right)^2 =\frac5{32}. \]
With 50–50 prior odds, Bayes' rule gives
\[ P(H\mid Q)=\frac{21/32}{21/32+5/32}=\frac{21}{26}. \]
The conditional claim value is
\[ E[V\mid Q]=120\frac{21}{26}+80\frac5{26} =\frac{2920}{26}=\boxed{\frac{1460}{13}\approx\$112.31}. \]
If the dealer incorrectly assumed independent notes with no chance of sharing, the likelihood ratio would be \((3/4)^2/(1/4)^2=9\), giving posterior \(9/10\) and value \(80+40(0.9)=\$116\). The extra $3.69 is spurious confidence from effectively counting the same inspection twice. The fair value is per claim; if both identical claims fill at a price set from this information, total expected underlying payoff is twice this per-claim value.

Assumptions

  • The claim payoff is common to both brokers and takes values 80 or 120 with equal prior probability.

  • The same-note event occurs with probability 1/2 independently of claim quality; conditional on no sharing, notes are independent given quality.

  • A high note deterministically generates a one-claim buy request; requests reveal no separate information beyond their notes.

Final Answer

\(P(120\mid\text{two buys})=21/26\); conditional fair value \(80+40(21/26)=1460/13\approx\$112.31\). Incorrect independent-signal value: $116.

Market making and microstructure
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A conference organiser has two large bookings that sometimes fail in the same week. A failure of booking A costs $100; a failure of booking B costs $200. There are no other losses. The joint weekly outcomes are:

What fails? Probability
Neither booking 0.60
A only 0.20
B only 0.10
Both 0.10

An insurer defines 75% expected shortfall (ES) as the mean loss in the worst 25% of weeks, with fractional weighting of outcomes if the 25% tail cuts through a group of equally bad weeks. First calculate ES for the organiser's total weekly loss. Then calculate 75% ES for A and B separately and compare their sum with the total ES. What happens at the loss quantile?

Hint 1

Sort the total loss outcomes from largest to smallest. After taking all $300 and $200 weeks, how much probability mass is still needed to make a 25% tail?

For booking B alone, its $200 loss occurs in 20% of weeks, so its 25% tail also includes 5% of zero-loss weeks. Use the same tail convention in every calculation.

The combined loss \(L=A+B\) has atoms: $0 with probability 0.60, $100 with 0.20, $200 with 0.10, and $300 with 0.10. In descending loss order, the worst 25% comprises:

  • 10% of weeks with $300 loss;
  • 10% with $200 loss;
  • 5% (not all 20%) of weeks with $100 loss.

The weighted tail loss is \(0.10(\$300)+0.10(\$200)+0.05(\$100)=\$55\) per randomly sampled week. Dividing by the tail probability 0.25 gives

\(\operatorname{ES}_{0.75}(L)=\frac{55}{0.25}=\)\(\$220\).

The 75% value-at-risk/quantile is $100: \(\Pr(L\le0)=0.60<0.75\), while \(\Pr(L\le100)=0.80\ge0.75\). The quantile lies inside a probability atom, which is why including every $100 week in the tail would overcount.

For booking A alone, loss $100 occurs in \(0.20+0.10=0.30\) of weeks. Its worst 25% consists entirely of $100 outcomes, so \(\operatorname{ES}_{0.75}(A)=\)\(\$100\).

For booking B alone, loss $200 occurs in \(0.10+0.10=0.20\) of weeks. Its worst 25% includes these 20% plus 5% of $0 weeks, giving \(\operatorname{ES}_{0.75}(B)=\frac{0.20(\$200)+0.05(\$0)}{0.25}=\)\(\$160\).

Consequently \(\operatorname{ES}_{0.75}(A)+\operatorname{ES}_{0.75}(B)=\$260>\$220=\operatorname{ES}_{0.75}(A+B)\). Measuring the bookings separately discards the diversification from their imperfectly coincident losses. All three computations use the same fractional-boundary rule.

Assumptions

  • The weekly loss table is the complete joint distribution; booking losses add on weeks when both fail.

  • 75% ES means the average loss over exactly 25% of probability mass sorted from worst to best.

  • Tied outcomes at the tail boundary may be fractionally included; zero losses are counted when needed to complete the tail.

Final Answer

\(\operatorname{ES}_{75\%}(A+B)=\$220\). Separately, \(\operatorname{ES}_{75\%}(A)=\$100\) and \(\operatorname{ES}_{75\%}(B)=\$160\), so their sum is $260. The combined 75% loss quantile is $100, and only 0.05 of the total 0.20 probability mass at $100 belongs in the worst 25% tail.

Risk, covariance and diversification
8

Seven members of a club are owed reimbursements. Because a shared expense was allocated using fractional cents, the bookkeeping system has seven exact amounts,…

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