Chicago Trading Company Interview Questions 2026

100 Questions Unlock all questions ↓
Filter
Topic area
Difficulty

Filters apply to the free questions below.

Practice Bank

Chicago Trading Company Quant Interview Practice

↗

A wildlife recorder runs on a battery rated at 128 watt-hours. Turning it on consumes 5 watt-hours immediately; the remaining energy powers a repeating 10-minute cycle. During each cycle it listens for eight minutes at 15 watts, then transmits for two minutes at 60 watts.

The field team will only count a session as complete if it ends after a transmission, not partway through a cycle. Assume the battery delivers its full rated energy and both power draws stay constant. What is the longest complete session the team can run on a fresh battery? Show why one more cycle is impossible.

Hint 1

Convert each operating mode’s watts and minutes into energy in watt-hours before adding them.

Each cycle uses \(15(8/60)+60(2/60)\) Wh. Remove the one-time 5 Wh overhead and take the integer part of the number of full cycles affordable.

Power multiplied by elapsed time gives energy. The eight-minute listening portion consumes \(15\times(8/60)=2\) Wh; the two-minute transmitting portion consumes \(60\times(2/60)=2\) Wh. Each complete 10-minute cycle therefore requires 4 Wh.

Startup takes 5 Wh once, leaving \(128-5=123\) Wh. For an integer number \(n\ge0\) of full cycles, the energy limit is
\[ 5+4n\le128 \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad n\le\frac{123}{4}=30.75. \]
The maximum possible integer is \(\boxed{n=30}\). It provides \(30\times10=\boxed{300\text{ minutes}=5\text{ hours}}\) of complete operation. Total consumption is \(5+4(30)=125\) Wh, leaving 3 Wh; a 31st cycle would use \(5+4(31)=129\) Wh, one Wh too much.

Taking the unweighted average of 15 and 60 watts would be incorrect because the two power modes run for different lengths of time. Counting a partial 31st cycle would also violate the full-cycle condition.

Assumptions

  • Watt-hours equal watts multiplied by hours.

  • The 5 Wh start-up consumption happens once, before any 10-minute operating cycle.

  • Only nonnegative whole numbers of complete cycles are allowed.

Final Answer

30 complete cycles, lasting 300 minutes (5 hours). Startup plus 30 cycles uses 125 Wh; a 31st would require 129 Wh, above the 128 Wh capacity.

Numerical reasoning and estimation
↗

A courier firm has exactly four scheduled deliveries each day. Its manager reports the following probabilities for the number \(L\) that finish late: 80% of days have at least one late delivery, 45% have at least two, 20% have at least three, and 5% have all four late. A separate report says no deliveries are late on 20% of days.

The reports refer to the same randomly selected day. Recover \(\Pr(L=k)\) for every \(k=0,1,2,3,4\) and decide whether the five published figures can all hold simultaneously. In particular, explain why the four at-least percentages cannot simply be treated as separate probabilities of exactly that many late deliveries.

Hint 1

The event \(L\ge2\) is included in \(L\ge1\); the tail events overlap. Subtract neighbouring tails to isolate exact counts.

Use \(\Pr(L=k)=\Pr(L\ge k)-\Pr(L\ge k+1)\) for \(k\ge1\), and \(\Pr(L=0)=1-\Pr(L\ge1)\). Then reconstruct the tails from the resulting masses.

Write \(S_k=\Pr(L\ge k)\) and note that \(L\) can take only the values 0 through 4, so \(S_5=0\). The reported tails give \(S_1=.80\), \(S_2=.45\), \(S_3=.20\) and \(S_4=.05\).

Successive differences yield

\(\Pr(L=1)=S_1-S_2=.35\), \(\Pr(L=2)=S_2-S_3=.25\), \(\Pr(L=3)=S_3-S_4=.15\), and \(\Pr(L=4)=S_4-S_5=.05\).

Also \(\Pr(L=0)=1-S_1=.20\), agreeing with the separate zero-late report. The five probabilities are nonnegative and sum to \(.20+.35+.25+.15+.05=1\), so they form a valid distribution. To verify the original cumulative reports, sum the reconstructed masses: \(\Pr(L\ge1)=.80\), \(\Pr(L\ge2)=.25+.15+.05=.45\), \(\Pr(L\ge3)=.15+.05=.20\), and \(\Pr(L\ge4)=.05\).

The at-least events are nested. For example, a day with four late deliveries contributes to every at-least report, so adding those headline percentages as though they were disjoint would double-count days.

Assumptions

  • Exactly four deliveries per day, so \(L\) is an integer in \(\{0,1,2,3,4\}\).

  • All listed percentages are unconditional probabilities for the same day-selection process.

Final Answer

\(\Pr(L=0,1,2,3,4)=\mathbf{(0.20,0.35,0.25,0.15,0.05)}\). All reports are consistent.

Probability foundations
↗

A race steward knows whether two kinds of incident occurred: a false start (F) and an equipment fault (E). Each independently occurs with probability 1/2 during a race.

The steward's public bulletin is limited to one line. If neither occurs, it says “No incident.” If only one occurs, it names that one. If both occur, the steward reports “False start” with probability 3/4 and “Equipment fault” with probability 1/4, using an independent random choice. Nothing in the bulletin says whether the other incident also happened.

After seeing the bulletin “False start,” what is the probability that an equipment fault also occurred?

Hint 1

A false-start-only race always produces “False start,” but a race with both incidents does so only three-quarters of the time.

Calculate \(\Pr(\text{both incidents and bulletin F})\) and \(\Pr(\text{bulletin F})\) separately; then divide. Do not treat all hidden states consistent with a false-start bulletin as equally likely.

Independence and the two 1/2 incident probabilities give four underlying states, each with probability 1/4: neither, F only, E only, and both.

The bulletin “False start” is produced with probability 1 in the F-only state and with probability 3/4 in the both-incidents state. Hence

\(\Pr(\text{bulletin F})=(\frac14)\cdot1+(\frac14)\cdot(\frac34)=\frac14+\frac3{16}=\)\(\frac7{16}\).

For E to have occurred on a race with that bulletin, the underlying state must be both incidents. Its joint probability with bulletin F is \((\frac14)(\frac34)=\frac3{16}\). Thus

\(\Pr(E\text{ occurred}\mid\text{bulletin F})=\frac{3/16}{7/16}=\)\(\frac37\).

As a consistency check, the equipment-fault bulletin has probability \(\frac14+(\frac14)(\frac14)=\frac5{16}\), and “No incident” occurs with probability \(\frac4{16}\). These add to \(\frac7{16}+\frac5{16}+\frac4{16}=1\). The observed line is evidence not only about which incidents are possible, but also about which line the steward preferentially selects when both are present.

Assumptions

  • The false start and equipment fault occur independently, each with probability 1/2.

  • The steward observes the true pair of incidents and follows the specified random reporting rule without error.

  • The 3/4 versus 1/4 choice when both occur is independent of everything else.

Final Answer

\(\frac37\approx42.857\%\).

Conditional probability
↗

At a climbing club, every session produces one performance score. The six session scores are independent draws from the same continuous distribution, so no two scores tie. A bell rings whenever the latest score is strictly higher than all preceding scores; the first session always rings the bell.

The club awards a cash bonus of \(\$(12+3i)\) for a new record in session \(i\), where \(i\) runs from 1 to 6. What is the expected total cash bonus across the season? You are not told the distribution of scores.

Hint 1

Among the first i exchangeable scores, each position is equally likely to contain the maximum. Translate that fact into the chance session i sets a record.

Sum the expected payment for each date using linearity of expectation; you do not need record indicators to be independent.

Let \(I_{i}\) be 1 if session i sets a strict record and 0 otherwise. Since the first i scores are independent and identically distributed from a continuous law, all i positions are equally likely to hold their maximum. Therefore \(P(I_{i}=1)=1/i\), including \(i=1\).

The season's bonus is \(B=\sum_{i=1}^{6}(12+3i)I_i\) dollars. By linearity, \(E[B]=\sum_{i=1}^{6}(12+3i)/i=12\sum_{i=1}^{6}1/i+3\sum_{i=1}^{6}1\). The sixth harmonic sum is \(1+1/2+1/3+1/4+1/5+1/6=49/20\). Hence \(E[B]=12(49/20)+18=29.4+18=\$47.40\). The indicators \(I_{i}\) are not being assumed independent; linearity is valid regardless of their joint distribution. The only role of continuity is to rule out tied maxima, which would require a different record convention.

Assumptions

  • Six session scores are iid from one continuous distribution.

  • A new record is strictly above every earlier score; the first observation is a record.

  • The bonus at session \(i\) is \(\$12+\$3i\), paid once if that session is a record.

Final Answer

$47.40 expected total bonus.

Expectation and expected value
↗

Two orchards send apples to a small market every week. Each privately chooses to deliver either one crate or two; the market price is £\(11-2(q_A+q_B)\) per crate when the total deliveries are \(q_A+q_B\), and neither orchard has any other cost. Choices become public after that week's sales.

They propose to cooperate by each delivering one crate. If anyone instead delivers two during a cooperative week, both must deliver two crates for the next four weeks, after which they return to one crate each. The four-week punishment runs its full course even if someone changes their delivery during it; no new punishment is added. Future weekly profits are discounted by a common factor \(\delta\), with \(0\le\delta<1\).

For what values of \(\delta\) can this strategy be a subgame-perfect equilibrium? Show that an orchard cannot gain by cheating during cooperation or during the punishment weeks. Explain why four punishment weeks, rather than a permanent price war, matter.

Hint 1

Compute one week's profit for each orchard at delivery pairs (1,1), (2,1), (1,2), and (2,2). Compare immediate temptation with the discounted four-week loss.

A cooperative deviation adds £3 now but brings four future weeks earning £6 instead of £7. During punishment, the other orchard delivers two: compare your payoff from delivering one versus two and ask whether your action changes the punishment countdown.

At \((q_A,q_B)=(1,1)\), the total is two crates, the price is £7 per crate, and each orchard earns £7. At \((2,1)\), price is £5: the deviator earns \(2\times\text{£}5=\text{£}10\) and the cooperator £5. At \((2,2)\), price is £3 and each earns £6. Thus cooperation pays \(R=7\), a one-week deviation against cooperation pays \(T=10\), and mutual high output pays \(P=6\). If the other orchard produces two, choosing one yields £5, less than the £6 from producing two.

Suppose a cooperative history has been reached. Cooperating gives the stream of £7 weekly. Deviating once raises today's profit by \(T-R=\text{£}3\) but creates four punishment weeks paying £6 instead of £7, starting next week. After those weeks the streams coincide again. Therefore the no-deviation condition is

\[3\le(7-6)(\delta+\delta^{2}+\delta^{3}+\delta^{4})=\delta+\delta^{2}+\delta^{3}+\delta^{4}\].

Equivalently, the gain difference between cooperation and deviation is \(-3+\delta+\delta^{2}+\delta^{3}+\delta^{4}\). The right side is strictly increasing on \([0,1]\), starts at zero and approaches four. Consequently, there is a unique threshold \(\delta^{*}\in(0,1)\), satisfying \((\delta^{*})^{4}+(\delta^{*})^{3}+(\delta^{*})^{2}+\delta^{*}-3=0\). Numerical evaluation gives \(\delta^{*}\approx0.8881796676\). The incentive holds at equality and for every δ above that threshold, up to but excluding \(\delta=1\).

During any of the four punishment periods, both are prescribed two crates. Because the other orchard is producing two, choosing two earns £6, versus £5 for choosing one. The punishment counter advances regardless of that choice, so neither the subsequent punishment periods nor the return date is affected. Delivering two is therefore strictly optimal in every punishment subgame. At cooperative histories the discounted one-shot deviation test above applies after any past return from punishment. These observations establish sequential incentives for the complete finite-state strategy by the one-deviation principle.

As a check, at \(\delta=0.9\) the four-week loss is \(0.9+0.81+0.729+0.6561=3.0951>\text{£}3\); at \(\delta=0.8\) it is \(2.3616<\text{£}3\). A finite punishment can deter cheating only if players value the four future losses enough. With permanent punishment the relevant discounted loss would be \(\frac{\delta}{1-\delta}\), a different condition.

Assumptions

  • Each orchard chooses only \(q=1\) or \(q=2\) every week, with the stated price formula and zero other costs.

  • Actions and deviations are observed after weekly sales; punishment begins the following week and lasts exactly four weeks.

  • During punishment, the countdown and return to cooperation do not change with further deviations.

  • Both agents use the same discounted-sum objective with \(0\le\delta<1\).

Final Answer

The strategy is subgame perfect for \(\delta\in[\delta^{*},1)\), where \(\delta^{*}\) is the unique root of \(\delta+\delta^{2}+\delta^{3}+\delta^{4}=3\) in (0,1), approximately 0.8881796676.

Game theory and strategic decisions
↗

A print dealer can supply up to two identical, limited-edition prints, paying a $2 supplier charge only for each print actually sold. One collector arrives now, followed by another; each can buy at most one print. The dealer may quote the first collector either $6 or $10. This collector's maximum willingness to pay is equally likely to be $6 or $10.

The second collector's initial maximum willingness to pay is independently $6 or $10, again with equal probabilities. But the collector watches what happened earlier: after a first sale at $10, their willingness rises by $4; after a first sale at $6, it falls by $2; if the first collector does not buy, it stays unchanged. The second collector never sees the first one's private valuation. After observing the first response, the dealer can quote any nonnegative price to the second collector. A collector buys exactly when the quote does not exceed their willingness.

What first quote maximizes the dealer's expected total profit, and what second quote should follow each possible response? Break ties between equally profitable second quotes by choosing the lower one.

Hint 1

Solve the last customer's pricing problem separately after each possible first outcome. The second customer's values change with the observed transaction price, not just the first collector's type.

At any second-stage history, a profit-maximizing quote can be chosen at one of the two possible values. For the first quote $6, the second values are $4 or $8; for a $10 sale, they are $10 or $14; after no sale, they are $6 or $10.

The dealer earns \(p-2\) on a sold print, and zero on an unsold print. The second collector's willingness to pay is independent of the first collector's value before the stated price adjustment. Work backward:

  • A first sale at $6: the second values are $4 or $8, each with probability 1/2. Quoting $4 yields \(4-2=\$2\) surely; quoting $8 yields \((8-2)/2=\$3\). The best follow-up quote is $8, for expected second-stage profit $3.
  • A first sale at $10: the second values become $10 or $14. Quote $10 and earn \(10-2=\$8\) surely; quoting $14 earns \((14-2)/2=\$6\). The best quote is $10, for $8 profit.
  • No first sale: the second values remain $6 or $10. Quoting $6 yields $4 for certain; quoting $10 yields \((10-2)/2=\$4\). Either maximizes profit; by the requested tie-break choose $6.

No price strictly between these possible valuations improves expected profit, since the sale probability is constant over each intervening interval and the margin increases with the quote. Any quote above the highest value produces no sale.

If the dealer first quotes $6, the first collector always buys, earning $4, and the optimal follow-up is worth $3: total expectation \(4+3=\$7\).

If the dealer first quotes $10, the first collector buys with probability 1/2, yielding expected first-stage profit \((10-2)/2=\$4\). The optimal continuation is worth $8 after a sale and $4 after no sale, each history occurring with probability 1/2. Thus total expected profit is

\[ \$4+\frac12(\$8)+\frac12(\$4)=\boxed{\$10}. \]

The $10 opening quote is uniquely optimal among the two allowed quotes. Its effect on the second collector's valuation creates an informational externality: optimizing the first immediate margin alone would not distinguish the first quotes, since either gives $4 expected immediate profit.

Assumptions

  • The dealer can sell at most one print to each collector and incurs $2 cost only for each sold print.

  • The first quote is restricted to $6 or $10; the second quote may be any nonnegative price.

  • Both private base valuations are independent and equiprobable.

  • The price-based change in the second collector’s willingness applies exactly as specified; ties are purchases and the lower profit-maximizing second quote wins ties.

Final Answer

Quote \(\$10\) first. After a $10 sale, quote \(\$10\) second; after no first sale, quote \(\$6\) second (\(\$10\) is equally profitable without the specified tie-break). Expected total profit is \(\$10\).

Market making and microstructure
↗

Two departments earn uncertain net revenues \(X\) and \(Y\), measured in thousands of dollars. Their risk estimates are
\[ \operatorname{SD}(X)=10,\qquad \operatorname{SD}(Y)=6,\qquad \operatorname{Cov}(X,Y)=-48. \]
The business cares about the standard deviation of the combined revenue \(X+Y\). Management wants to allocate that combined risk back to the two departments according to the marginal effect of each department's position, rather than in proportion to its standalone standard deviation.

Introduce temporary exposure weights \(a,b\) on \(X,Y\), differentiate \(\operatorname{SD}(aX+bY)\), and use the derivatives at \(a=b=1\) to obtain each department's Euler risk contribution. Does one department have a negative contribution? Check that the two contributions sum to total risk, and that the covariance numbers are possible.

Hint 1

First calculate \(\operatorname{Var}(aX+bY)=100a^2+36b^2-96ab\). Differentiate its square root, not just the variance.

Euler contribution from X is \(a\,\partial\sigma/\partial a\), and similarly for Y, evaluated at \(a=b=1\). A negative covariance can make a marginal contribution negative.

Define
\[ \sigma(a,b)=\sqrt{100a^2+36b^2-96ab}. \]
At the actual exposure \(a=b=1\), total variance is \(100+36-96=40\), so \(\sigma=\sqrt{40}\) thousand dollars. When \(\sigma>0\), differentiation gives
\[ \frac{\partial\sigma}{\partial a}=\frac{100a-48b}{\sigma},\qquad \frac{\partial\sigma}{\partial b}=\frac{36b-48a}{\sigma}. \]
The (weight times marginal derivative) Euler contributions at unit weights are
\[ RC_X=1\cdot\frac{100-48}{\sqrt{40}}=\boxed{\frac{52}{\sqrt{40}}\approx8.222}, \]
\[ RC_Y=1\cdot\frac{36-48}{\sqrt{40}}=\boxed{-\frac{12}{\sqrt{40}}\approx-1.897}. \]
Their sum is \((52-12)/\sqrt{40}=40/\sqrt{40}=\sqrt{40}\), exactly the portfolio's standard deviation. This is an instance of the Euler identity for a positively homogeneous risk measure.

A negative marginal risk contribution does not mean Y has negative standalone risk: Y alone has standard deviation 6. It means adding a small amount of Y to the current mix reduces total standard deviation because the covariance with X is sufficiently negative. The portfolio risk remains nonnegative.

Finally, the implied correlation is \(\rho=-48/(10\cdot6)=-0.8\), within \([-1,1]\). The covariance matrix is positive definite because \(100\cdot36-48^2=1296>0\). Thus the proposed risks can arise jointly.

Assumptions

  • The exposures are exactly one unit of each department; the temporary weights exist only to define derivatives.

  • The provided standard deviations, covariance and combined revenue exhaust the risk model; total risk is nonzero.

  • Risk contribution means weight times marginal contribution to portfolio standard deviation, in thousand-dollar SD units—not a literal cash transfer.

Final Answer

Total SD = \(\sqrt{40}\approx6.325\) thousand dollars. Euler contributions: \(X:52/\sqrt{40}\approx8.222\) and \(Y:-12/\sqrt{40}\approx-1.897\) thousand dollars; they sum to \(\sqrt{40}\). Correlation is −0.8, hence the covariance is valid.

Risk, covariance and diversification
8

Two ceramic workshops have one electricity meter. Workshop A uses 70 kWh in a month and workshop B uses 50 kWh. The supplier charges a $18 monthly standing…

Unlock the rest

Keep practising with 93 more questions, available hints and full worked solutions.

Explore Premium

© 2026 EverythingQuant. All Rights Reserved.