Question
A print dealer can supply up to two identical, limited-edition prints, paying a $2 supplier charge only for each print actually sold. One collector arrives now, followed by another; each can buy at most one print. The dealer may quote the first collector either $6 or $10. This collector's maximum willingness to pay is equally likely to be $6 or $10.
The second collector's initial maximum willingness to pay is independently $6 or $10, again with equal probabilities. But the collector watches what happened earlier: after a first sale at $10, their willingness rises by $4; after a first sale at $6, it falls by $2; if the first collector does not buy, it stays unchanged. The second collector never sees the first one's private valuation. After observing the first response, the dealer can quote any nonnegative price to the second collector. A collector buys exactly when the quote does not exceed their willingness.
What first quote maximizes the dealer's expected total profit, and what second quote should follow each possible response? Break ties between equally profitable second quotes by choosing the lower one.
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Hint 1
Solve the last customer's pricing problem separately after each possible first outcome. The second customer's values change with the observed transaction price, not just the first collector's type.
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Solution
The dealer earns \(p-2\) on a sold print, and zero on an unsold print. The second collector's willingness to pay is independent of the first collector's value before the stated price adjustment. Work backward:
- A first sale at $6: the second values are $4 or $8, each with probability 1/2. Quoting $4 yields \(4-2=\$2\) surely; quoting $8 yields \((8-2)/2=\$3\). The best follow-up quote is $8, for expected second-stage profit $3.
- A first sale at $10: the second values become $10 or $14. Quote $10 and earn \(10-2=\$8\) surely; quoting $14 earns \((14-2)/2=\$6\). The best quote is $10, for $8 profit.
- No first sale: the second values remain $6 or $10. Quoting $6 yields $4 for certain; quoting $10 yields \((10-2)/2=\$4\). Either maximizes profit; by the requested tie-break choose $6.
No price strictly between these possible valuations improves expected profit, since the sale probability is constant over each intervening interval and the margin increases with the quote. Any quote above the highest value produces no sale.
If the dealer first quotes $6, the first collector always buys, earning $4, and the optimal follow-up is worth $3: total expectation \(4+3=\$7\).
If the dealer first quotes $10, the first collector buys with probability 1/2, yielding expected first-stage profit \((10-2)/2=\$4\). The optimal continuation is worth $8 after a sale and $4 after no sale, each history occurring with probability 1/2. Thus total expected profit is
\[ \$4+\frac12(\$8)+\frac12(\$4)=\boxed{\$10}. \]
The $10 opening quote is uniquely optimal among the two allowed quotes. Its effect on the second collector's valuation creates an informational externality: optimizing the first immediate margin alone would not distinguish the first quotes, since either gives $4 expected immediate profit.
Assumptions
The dealer can sell at most one print to each collector and incurs $2 cost only for each sold print.
The first quote is restricted to $6 or $10; the second quote may be any nonnegative price.
Both private base valuations are independent and equiprobable.
The price-based change in the second collector’s willingness applies exactly as specified; ties are purchases and the lower profit-maximizing second quote wins ties.
Final Answer
Quote \(\$10\) first. After a $10 sale, quote \(\$10\) second; after no first sale, quote \(\$6\) second (\(\$10\) is equally profitable without the specified tie-break). Expected total profit is \(\$10\).