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Question

Two orchards send apples to a small market every week. Each privately chooses to deliver either one crate or two; the market price is £\(11-2(q_A+q_B)\) per crate when the total deliveries are \(q_A+q_B\), and neither orchard has any other cost. Choices become public after that week's sales.

They propose to cooperate by each delivering one crate. If anyone instead delivers two during a cooperative week, both must deliver two crates for the next four weeks, after which they return to one crate each. The four-week punishment runs its full course even if someone changes their delivery during it; no new punishment is added. Future weekly profits are discounted by a common factor \(\delta\), with \(0\le\delta<1\).

For what values of \(\delta\) can this strategy be a subgame-perfect equilibrium? Show that an orchard cannot gain by cheating during cooperation or during the punishment weeks. Explain why four punishment weeks, rather than a permanent price war, matter.

Hint 1

Compute one week's profit for each orchard at delivery pairs (1,1), (2,1), (1,2), and (2,2). Compare immediate temptation with the discounted four-week loss.

A cooperative deviation adds £3 now but brings four future weeks earning £6 instead of £7. During punishment, the other orchard delivers two: compare your payoff from delivering one versus two and ask whether your action changes the punishment countdown.

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