Question
A concert venue can choose between two insurance arrangements for cancellation losses. Policy A leaves the venue with a $50 loss half the time and a $150 loss half the time. Policy B leaves it with either $0 or $200 in losses, also with equal probabilities. The costs of purchasing the policies are identical, and the distributions already include all cancellation-related payments. The venue starts with $1,000 before these losses.
Both policies have an expected loss of $100. Can you say which policy every decision-maker with increasing, concave utility of final wealth weakly prefers, without assuming a particular utility formula? Prove your answer using stop-loss expectations or an equivalent mean-preserving-spread argument. When is the preference strict?
Get hint
Hint 1
Equal means alone are not enough. Compare the expected amount by which each loss exceeds an arbitrary threshold t.
Check your answer
Solution
Let \(L_{A}\) and \(L_{B}\) denote the net losses. Their common expectation is $100. For any threshold t define the stop-loss function \(S_{L}(t)=\mathbb{E}[(L-t)_{+}]\), where \(x_{+}=\max(x,0)\). The proposed distributions give \(S_{A}(t)=\frac{1}{2}(50-t)_{+}+\frac{1}{2}(150-t)_{+}\) and \(S_{B}(t)=\frac{1}{2}(-t)_{+}+\frac{1}{2}(200-t)_{+}\).
For \(t\le0\), both equal \(100-t\), so \(S_{B}-S_{A}=0\). On \(0<t<50\), \(S_{A}=100-t\) and \(S_{B}=100-\frac{t}{2}\), yielding \(S_{B}-S_{A}=\frac{t}{2}>0\). On \(50\le t<150\), \(S_{A}=75-\frac{t}{2}\) and \(S_{B}=100-\frac{t}{2}\), so the difference is 25. On \(150\le t<200\), \(S_{A}=0\) and \(S_{B}=100-\frac{t}{2}\ge0\). For \(t\ge200\), both are zero. Consequently \(S_{A}(t)\le S_{B}(t)\) at every threshold, with equal mean; equivalently \(L_{A}\) is below \(L_{B}\) in convex order.
For a direct proof, couple the two distributions as follows: let \(P(L_{B}=200\mid L_{A}=50)=\frac{1}{4}\) and \(P(L_{B}=200\mid L_{A}=150)=\frac{3}{4}\). Since A has equal probabilities on 50 and 150, this produces \(P(L_{B}=200)=\frac{1}{2}\) and \(\mathbb{E}[L_{B}\mid L_{A}]=L_{A}\). With any concave utility u of wealth, conditional Jensen gives \(\mathbb{E}[u(1000-L_{B})\mid L_{A}]\le u(1000-\mathbb{E}[L_{B}\mid L_{A}])=u(1000-L_{A})\). Averaging shows \(\mathbb{E}[u(1000-L_{A})]\ge\mathbb{E}[u(1000-L_{B})]\). The inequality is strict for strictly concave u because the conditional distribution of \(L_{B}\) is nondegenerate for both A values. Linear (risk-neutral) utility is indifferent. A decision-maker whose utility is not concave need not share the ranking.
Assumptions
All payouts and premiums are already incorporated into the stated dollar loss distributions.
The comparison is in expected utility of final wealth, with no other uncertain wealth components.
Increasing concave utilities are defined over the possible final wealth interval [$800,$1,000].
Final Answer
Policy A is weakly preferred by every increasing concave final-wealth utility; it is strictly preferred for strictly concave utility. B is a mean-preserving spread of A.