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Question

Two co-owners must agree before sending fragile camera equipment on a weather-sensitive expedition. The weather is good with probability 60% and bad otherwise. If they depart, each co-owner earns $200 in good weather but loses $200 in bad weather. If either votes to veto, the trip is cancelled and each earns $0. Voting is simultaneous.

Before voting, each may privately buy a weather report for $16.80, whether or not the trip ultimately departs. A report says good or bad and is correct with probability 80% in either weather state. The two reports are independent conditional on the actual weather. Neither the report purchase nor its contents are visible to the other co-owner before the votes.

Find a symmetric equilibrium in which each co-owner buys a report with some probability \(q\), vetoes after a bad report, and otherwise permits departure. Derive \(q\) and check that neither the report decision nor any of the voting decisions offers a profitable unilateral deviation. Why does the other person's veto policy affect the value of buying information?

Hint 1

A vote for departure only matters when the other owner also permits. Calculate the probability that the other owner permits in good weather and in bad weather as functions of q.

Compare the expected payoff from permitting without a report with the payoff from permitting only after a good report, minus the $16.80 report price. Equate these payoffs for an interior mixed purchase strategy, then check each signal's voting incentive.

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