Question
Two co-owners must agree before sending fragile camera equipment on a weather-sensitive expedition. The weather is good with probability 60% and bad otherwise. If they depart, each co-owner earns $200 in good weather but loses $200 in bad weather. If either votes to veto, the trip is cancelled and each earns $0. Voting is simultaneous.
Before voting, each may privately buy a weather report for $16.80, whether or not the trip ultimately departs. A report says good or bad and is correct with probability 80% in either weather state. The two reports are independent conditional on the actual weather. Neither the report purchase nor its contents are visible to the other co-owner before the votes.
Find a symmetric equilibrium in which each co-owner buys a report with some probability \(q\), vetoes after a bad report, and otherwise permits departure. Derive \(q\) and check that neither the report decision nor any of the voting decisions offers a profitable unilateral deviation. Why does the other person's veto policy affect the value of buying information?
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Hint 1
A vote for departure only matters when the other owner also permits. Calculate the probability that the other owner permits in good weather and in bad weather as functions of q.
Check your answer
Solution
A single veto cancels both owners' earnings, so the return to permitting depends on whether the other owner permits. Suppose the other owner buys with probability \(q\), permits without a report or after a good report, and vetoes after a bad report. Conditional on good weather, that owner permits with probability \((1-q)+0.8q=1-0.2q\). Conditional on bad weather, permission has probability \((1-q)+0.2q=1-0.8q\).
For an owner with no report, permitting therefore has expected trip payoff
\[U_0(q)=0.6(200)(1-0.2q)+0.4(-200)(1-0.8q)=40+40q.\]
Vetoing earns zero, so permitting is optimal for any \(q\in[0,1]\). If the owner buys a report, the unconditional joint contributions to expected payoff from permitting after each possible signal are
\[U_{+}(q)=0.6(0.8)(200)(1-0.2q)-0.4(0.2)(200)(1-0.8q)=80-6.4q,\]
\[U_{-}(q)=0.6(0.2)(200)(1-0.2q)-0.4(0.8)(200)(1-0.8q)=-40+46.4q.\]
Each is the probability-weighted payoff from the specified signal and the other person's permission; because the probability of each signal is positive, its sign also gives the correct conditional voting preference. Whenever \(q<40/46.4\), a positive report warrants permission and a negative report warrants veto. At such \(q\), the net value of buying and then voting optimally is \(U_+(q)-16.80=63.20-6.4q\). For genuinely mixed acquisition, both buying and not buying must be best responses:
\[63.20-6.4q=40+40q\quad\Longrightarrow\quad q=\frac{23.20}{46.4}=\boxed{\tfrac12}.\]
Check the candidate equilibrium at \(q=1/2\). The other owner permits with probability 0.9 in good weather and 0.6 in bad weather. An uninformed owner earns $60 by permitting, versus $0 by vetoing. For an informed owner, the signal-weighted payoff from permitting after a good report is \(U_+(1/2)=76.80>0\); after a bad report it is \(U_-(1/2)=-16.80<0\). Thus permitting after good and vetoing after bad are individually optimal, not just assumed. Buying yields \(76.80-16.80=\$60\) after its report cost, exactly the $60 from not buying, so randomising 50:50 is also optimal. This verifies a symmetric Nash equilibrium (not a claim that all equilibria have this form).
Finally, the optimal gross value of information, before subtracting the report price, is \(V(q)=\max\{0,U_+(q)\}+\max\{0,U_-(q)\}-U_0(q)=\max\{0,40-46.4q\}\). For \(0\le q<25/29\), a bad report is vetoed and the benefit is \(40-46.4q\); at \(q=25/29\) the bad-report voter is indifferent. For \(q>25/29\), even a bad report favors permitting, so the owner ignores its content and receives zero gross information benefit rather than a negative value. The information benefit therefore decreases then remains zero as the other owner is more likely to veto on bad weather. At the equilibrium \(q=1/2\), its gross benefit is $16.80, exactly the report price.
Assumptions
Each owner receives the stated personal trip payoff; cancellation produces zero trip payoff, excluding any report fee already paid.
Report accuracy is 80% in each weather state; purchased reports are conditionally independent given weather.
Acquisition choices, reports and simultaneous votes are private until the departure decision is determined.
All agents maximise their own expected monetary net payoff and know the stated common prior and rules.
Final Answer
A symmetric mixed equilibrium has \(q=\frac12\). Buy a report with probability 1/2; if bought, permit on 'good' and veto on 'bad'; without a report, permit. Each information option gives $60 expected net payoff against this policy.